We can choose our friends but not neighbours. Bhutan is wedged between the two Asian giants, India & China. Historically, the Himalayan nation has sought peace & maintained focus on Gross National Happiness (GNH), but as China continues expansionism & India unwilling to buckle, this precarious situation of the Drukpas remains a critical challenge.
Three attributes mainly dictate national relations: Geography, Culture & Trade. With gradual plains in the south & steep peaks towards the north, even before the enthronement of the Wangchucks in 1907, the flow of people & trade was mostly from the Indian side. Chumbi Valley route did offer access to Tibet, but years of Mongol-Tibetan Invaders kept faith low on promises of riches from the north. Buddhism came to Bhutan in 747 AD, but unlike the Gelugpa (Yellow Hats) sect from Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet the Bhutanese majority follows Nyingmapa (Red hats) sect with important monasteries located at Paro, Bumthang (in Bhutan) & Tawang (in India). Even the Kolkata-Malbazaar-Sikkim Silk route that had trade tributaries integrated from Bhutan, was mostly a South to North flow of merchandise. Thus, Bhutan organically aligned with the southern side on historical fundamentals & not on post-colonial ideals.
The 2019 boundary deal between Bhutan & China, did produce a steam let-off in the relations, but with imagery of Chinese settlements in isolated border areas of Bhutan, their promises look to be as reliable as their products. With ‘control’ as the aim, China intends to go for the bigger prize in Bhutan, ‘influence.’ The toolkit is already in motion.
In targeted Influence Operations, the slight, imperceptible, incremental change in behaviour is the objective. The strongest play in this game is ‘habituation’. If a person develops a habit of accessing information, in a particular way, his habit can be exploited to implant perceptions. Chinese activism seeks to exploit: weak state institutions, fragile civil societies, or countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. With a GINI Index of 37.4 & GNH a priority, Bhutan is not an easy target, but the fragile stability does offer opportunities in three ways:
- Chinese influence that shapes or constrains choices and opinions of local political and economic elites.
- Chinese activities that influence or constrain the parameters of local media and public opinion.
- China’s impact on local civil society and academia.
With the onboarding of democracy & cultural opening-up in Bhutan, communication platforms were the first inroad targeted by the Chinese. The Bhutan InfoCom & Media Authority lists many active newspapers, with the major ones being Kuensel & The Bhutanese publishing in English & Dzongkha. A scan of these will indicate perceived freedom for journalists to comment on local issues, Indian issues & global news but a minimal critique on the state. While not much is picked up by these papers from the Chinese media, Indian discourse seems to find editorial interest. This undertow of highlighting the noisy Indian democracy seems to be the first straw in managing information flow for the Chinese operatives.
On the internet front, the majority of Bhutanese took to WeChat as the community messaging service (I don’t call it social media). Only a small group that needed to communicate with contacts in India adopted Whatsapp. The WeChat ecosystem has provided easy opportunities to proliferate anti-India sentiments and sometimes even anti-west information. On social media too, the Bhutanese access broadband information, including Chinese Social media, which at any level is just state propaganda because these platforms are banned for the Chinese public. In major population centres like Phuentsholing, Thimphu & Paro, discussion boards on Facebook reveal sharing & commenting on common threads like issues with infrastructure developed by Indian organisations, aspirations of elite-tourism (high paying travellers only), and social issues in India. While people should be free to discuss anything they like, everything comes with a context & a budgetary reality. If not accorded the correct perspective, these discussions are certain to get mainstreamed. Unwillingly influencing free choice.
Armed with spare cash accumulated from trade excesses with the world, China offered $10 Billion to Bhutan in 2017, during the peak of the Doklam crisis. Now, this was symbolic against what India integrates with Bhutan, but was clearly vectored towards a debt trap since it far exceeded the absorptive capacity of the Bhutanese economy. While India offers assistance & sustainable hydropower investments, Chinese financial help to countries is mostly turning into long-term headaches, Sri Lanka being the latest victim.
Anyone who has travelled there will agree that Bhutan is a peaceful abode. It is not perfect but the general aspiration is to live in this imperfect harmony. However, this balance is as dynamic as the definition of happiness. People today are exposed to luxuries & they continue to climb Maslow’s pyramid, with time. Carbon Negative & GNH concepts are getting redefined. Today, Beautiful valleys aside, Ferro-Silicon Industries in Pasakha on the Indian border spew effluents that have continuously degraded the quality of tea from the gardens on the Indian side. The Barsa river water bears the ill effects of these industries as it flows into India and the effects from factories at Samste, Gelephu is the same. COVID induced tourism ban has shattered the low/middle-end tourism industry dependent on tourists from the nearby Indian States. This impacted a large number of Bhutanese livelihoods and speaks of the robustness of medical facilities available. The Lhotshompa expulsion issue may be suppressed now, but it will always be a chapter of Bhutanese history. Ideals are easy, civilisation is costly.
It may have faults, but the Bhutanese people do deserve ‘Sovereignty’. Of land, of choice & of their way of life. The influence of media may just be the next step towards continued expansion by China inside the Land of Thunder Dragon. Sometimes, the worst part for Bhutan seems to be the need for choosing between things it does not want.
